Number Two In The Trump Pentagon Talks

A translation from German of an Apollo News interview with China hawk Elbridge Colby:

 Elbridge Colby will become the US's chief military strategist and political number two in the Pentagon under Trump. This spring, he explained in an Apollo News interview why Asia is now the "decisive theater" for the US, which must be prioritized over Europe.

In Germany, people are only too happy to show a caricature of US foreign policy - especially when it comes to Trump. They are all Putin friends who want to leave Ukraine and Europe to the Russians, they say. But even during his time in office from 2017 to 2021, there was often a gap between Trump's impulsive, often scandalous statements and the actual actions of his government, which often have a much deeper motivation than Trump's appearances make it seem.

The implementation of the geopolitical lines of the USA takes place in the apparatus of political officials (ministers, heads of agencies, etc.), who are replaced every four to eight years with each new president. They do not make headlines here, but they formulate government policy and thus change the course of world history. In the run-up to the 2024 US election, Apollo News therefore spoke to those who will really direct government policy on key issues. One of them will now be Trump's No. 2 in the Pentagon:

Elbridge Colby was not only one of the most prominent and important conservative military strategists in the USA - he is now officially one: As Trump announced on Sunday evening, Colby is to be given the top job of "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy", which puts him at the highest strategic level in the Pentagon - in the view of many observers, the number two job in the US Department of Defense - and will therefore have a decisive influence on the military strategy and security policy of the USA, including towards Germany.

In the first Trump administration, Colby was still Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, but was already responsible for drafting the United States ' groundbreaking 2018 National Defense Strategy, which prioritized the historic threat posed by China. Since leaving government service, he has written, among other things, the book "The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict," named one of the ten best books of 2021 by the Wall Street Journal In an exclusive interview with Apollo News this spring, Colby spoke about why China is the "biggest rival" the United States has "ever faced" - which is why it is imperative that the USA, no matter which government is in power, will shift its resources fully to China and East Asia. Europe must quickly recognize this reality - because it must be able to manage the continent's defense essentially on its own. He also makes this clear with drastic words to German politicians. He sees Germany as the still dormant but crucial "cornerstone" of European defense policy.

Apollo News: You defined the "Strategy of Denial" in your book. Based on everything we hear, it is very likely that these ideas will be implemented in the next Republican administration. What would that mean in concrete terms?

Elbridge Colby: First of all, I wouldn't claim any personal influence. What I will say is that I think my strategy is most consistent with the "America first" agenda. But America first doesn't mean America alone.

It's not America burying its head in the sand, but it's not the same old policy either. It's not George W. Bush's foreign policy. That is, you can't pretend that we're still in 1989, that China is a tenth of our economic size, that we can bomb around without worrying or throw money around like nobody's business.

Our arms industry is in a bad state. US Federal Reserve Chairman Jay Powell recently said that debt is becoming a really serious problem here. We have border problems. We have recruitment problems in our military. 

The middle way between isolation and intervention everywhere is for me the strategy of denial, or whatever you want to call it, which goes back to a core of American foreign policy that is similar to traditional British foreign policy with regard to the European continent; which is to deny any state the opportunity to dominate a key region of the world.

And of course the most important region is Asia, followed by Europe. That was different 70 years ago when all the major economies were in Europe, then Europe was the most important region. Now Asia is what Winston Churchill would call the "decisive theatre". A concept that is very common in strategic thinking, namely that Asia today has the largest share of global economic productivity, measured by GDP or something similar. That share is approaching 50 percent, and in the future it will be over 50 percent.

And China, in turn, accounts for about 50 percent of Asia's GDP. China is the biggest rival we have ever faced. Much bigger than the Nazis or Imperial Germany or the Soviet Union compared to the United States. That is a completely different dimension. Anyone who doesn't see that is living in the past.

The biggest question in your book is probably the Chinese-American war over Taiwan. Can you explain why a small country like Taiwan is so important? In Europe, people like to say that it's about democracy or their semiconductor industry...

Taiwan is critical, from a military and geopolitical perspective, to the successful functioning of what I call the anti-hegemonic coalition. You have to understand that coalitions are essentially defined not by their shared values ​​but by their shared opposition to this emerging hegemon. So the United States made common cause with Stalin in World War II, and Republican France and Tsarist Russia in World War I. And so on and so forth.

That's the basic idea. And the fact that Taiwan is a democracy is commendable. But I don't think many Americans should risk their lives just to defend someone else's democracy. The reason Taiwan is so important is because if China were able to conquer Taiwan, it could break out of the first Pacific island chain militarily, which would allow it to project further power.

And it would raise significant, reasonable doubts among regional Asian states about the reliability and strength of the United States relative to the threat posed by China, which could lead to their subjugation [to China]. If the United States did not play the role of what I call the external cornerstone balancer in my book, there is a very good chance that this coalition would fail and China would achieve its hegemonic goals.

Meanwhile, in Europe, Russia is not even the largest economy and the EU or NATO, depending on how you define it, far surpasses the Russian economy, even a Russian war economy. If the Europeans really wanted to, they could easily counterbalance Russian military power. And what makes my rhetoric a little bit sharper toward Europe are two things. First, I want to convey a sense of urgency, because obviously the Europeans have ignored the Americans for decades, right?

I mean, obviously. [US Secretary of Defense] Robert Gates gave a speech ten years ago that was politely listened to - and completely ignored. Barack Obama said something once. Basically, Donald Trump got results on European defense spending, but we're nowhere near where we need to be. Joe Biden went back to the old way of being nice.

And the fact is: Both the Trump administration and the Biden administration have the same Department of Defense Force Planning Construct. That tells you what kind of military you want to build. That plan focuses on being able to beat the Chinese in a potential war - which we don't have the confidence to do right now because we don't have the ability to fight two wars at the same time. So if a war breaks out in Asia, the US will have to focus on that. That will make Europe even more vulnerable. If a war breaks out on the European continent first, that's even more true: In a war over Europe, including over NATO, the US would have to hold back its resources.

Because if we didn't, we would use them up and use them, and then the Chinese would be mad not to get Taiwan. And the historical analogy I'm using here is that in 1940, when the Anglo-French forces were collapsing in the Battle of France, the French were begging for more help from Britain. Churchill wanted to send more Spitfires and Hurricanes [aircraft in World War II] to help, but the Royal Air Force said, "If you do that, we're not going to be able to defend Britain ourselves." And he did, and in the end nobody doubted Churchill's determination to defeat the Nazis, but you have to make a thoughtful decision. 

So part of all this is the urgency and the second part is particularly about Germany. And I'm a great admirer of German culture and so on and Germany and its history - most of it anyway. 

But the thing is, you and I know you can do better. I know it's hard, but we all [here in America] pay 3 percent of our GDP. Sorry, 3 percent of my income doesn't go to my kids or whatever, or my health care, it goes to defense! To our allies. We're not worried about a Russian invasion of North Dakota.

During the Cold War, after World War II, after the Nazi atrocities and aggression, West Germany still had an incredibly strong military. It had 12 active divisions and three in reserve in 1988. It had a huge tactical air force. It was the backbone of NATO's military presence. That was 35 years ago!

In your book you also speak very enthusiastically about German defense strategy and policy in the 1980s. Can you explain that?

Yes, one of the best strategic documents I've ever seen is the German Defense White Paper of 1983. I mean, I've only read it in English, but I'm sure it's even better in German. It deals not only with the military threat from the Soviet Union, but also with how that threat affects politics. Of course, there was a realization that war could break out, but there was also a fear that the Soviets would try to "Finlandize" West Germany and forcibly take it over to support their model and their Soviet empire.

Germany reduced its military after the Cold War because of the peace dividend, for reasons I can understand. But that's over! That's an explanation, not an excuse. Everyone has difficult challenges. We, the United States, are facing a match for the first time in our history, at least in the last hundred-plus years, with China.

And Germany's and Europe's defense policy has not responded to that when we tried to explain it nicely. Now we have to try something tougher. And those who are not pushing you in that direction [the Biden administration] are doing you a disservice, because the realities I'm talking about are structural and they will exist no matter who wins the election in 2024 or 2028 or 2032.

And if you are not prepared, you will be unprotected. And I don't want you to be exposed [to Russia], but as a famous Italian novel says, things must change to remain the same. For me, Germany's moral obligation is not pacifism, that is clear. 

I mean, Heiko Maas always went around talking about "people power" - all well and good, but at the end of the day the Soviets saw a front of German and American troops and a lot of nuclear weapons and decided it wasn't worth trying to attack.

Nobody has benefited more from NATO's collective defense than West Germany, while other countries like Poland have suffered under Soviet occupation. And, you know, I'm trying not to make too much of a fuss, but of all the NATO countries, Germany shouldn't have some sense of collective obligation, should it?

For a country that prides itself on being a moral leader, Angela Merkel literally came to our country and said she was the leader of the free world. OK, let's see you follow through on that militarily. 

In your opinion, what should a modern German army look like in terms of size?

The exact composition of brigades, divisions, corps can be discussed by military specialists. Essentially, European NATO armies are needed that will deprive the Russians of the opportunity to penetrate NATO territory and take and hold important areas. Defending Poland and Finland is quite feasible. I think it is more difficult with the Baltic states, but I think it would be feasible with a significant German effort.

I guess it would take a lot less than what the Federal Republic, which was then two-thirds the size of today's Germany, did in 1988. So it's all about getting back into the game. You know, the Germans say, "Oh, we need more time." We don't have time! We, the United States, have wasted time in Asia and you have wasted time when it comes to Europe!

The main problem is that NATO is still too dependent on the Americans. If it does that, it is a big mistake for the reasons I have mentioned. So they are building a sandcastle. Germany should be the cornerstone of European defense. America should, in my opinion, remain involved in some ways, for example in nuclear weapons. But Europe should take the main responsibility for its own defense.

Eisenhower would have a heart attack at the current situation. Eisenhower said it would be a great failure if there were any American troops left in Europe, I think that's his quote. So, you know, this is supposed to be a partnership.

NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen comes to Washington to lecture us about the Ukraine package and so on, and then I ask myself: how did the defense spending of European countries develop when you were Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Rasmussen? How about a lot less of this high-sounding rhetoric and saying how important the Americans are - that benefits the people here in Washington, but it doesn't help ordinary Americans.

In Germany, on the one hand, there are centre-left and centre-right parties in the political spectrum who support the transatlantic alliance but do little to specifically rearm the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, there are those on the far left and right who see America as a kind of imperial threat and who themselves seek proximity to Moscow. What would you say to them?

Well, I think it's the Germans who have to decide this among themselves. I'm for democracy.

But if you want to save the transatlantic system, then you have to do more. The way all these people make big statements about NATO and then do nothing - that's not how it works. So if you want to save it, then you really have to make this "turning point". I mean, what AKK said in a big speech when she was defense minister, I think in 2020. All well and good, that would be great. But then just do it!

Germany is a safe country, has recognized borders, low military spending over the last 30 years. It seems to me that you want to maintain the system, but you have to do your part. I mean, we're all adults. We all spend over 3 percent of GDP. You spend about one and a half percent. I mean, come on. Let's get down to earth here.

Politicians in Europe are currently often arguing that supporting Ukraine is also about preventing Xi in China from invading Taiwan. What do you think about that?

 I can understand the argument about the Ukraine-Taiwan connection because it helps European interests. I just don't think it's true. Credibility certainly plays a role in human affairs and in war and peace. I just don't think that for Taiwan, Ukraine is the primary or even secondary factor. The main factor will be the military balance on the ground. The degree of American resolve and Japanese and Taiwanese resolve to defend themselves.

That's not to say that the mission in Ukraine isn't important. It is important and it's a just cause. That's not the problem. But if Taiwan's fate were really to be decided in Ukraine, then China would be much more directly involved - it would probably send military forces. After all, Taiwan is of vital importance to China.

But of course you don't see that at all. Rather, the Chinese are behaving as I would expect: trying to continue the war, supporting the Russians without paying the full price, trying to shift the balance of power and the balance of determination on the ground in their favor.

I think we have damaged our position in the Pacific by our overemphasis on Ukraine: some weapons, direct compromises on weapons that could go to Taiwan, but more so the money we sent and the political will of the American people. I mean, right now we have a big discussion in the United States about the big package on U.S. border security, Ukraine, and more. $60 billion of that is going to Ukraine, a very small part of that may go to Asia. We don't even know exactly how much. If you want to prevent a Chinese attack on Taiwan, you should focus on preventing a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Period.

One final, somewhat speculative question: When do you think an invasion of Taiwan might occur? Before Xi Jinping's 2027 deadline for military readiness?

I don't think any of us know what Xi Jinping really thinks. I think their military has improved significantly in the last few years, so if you were Xi, you might decide to wait until the military is in better shape. On the other hand, in 1939, the German high command was against going to war, but Hitler said, well, you know, you'll never be better prepared, the economy will never be better, in fact, the Allies will be better armed. So we're going to do it now. Unfortunately, he was right.

Admiral Paparo was recently at his Senate confirmation hearing for the post of commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. And he pointed out that 2027 is just a timeline for the development of forces, but that doesn't mean they're only going to attack after that, they could attack before that, we don't know. So we have to be ready, as he said, today, tomorrow, a year from now, and five years from now. So the realities that I'm talking about are going to endure.

Thank you for the interview!

For better readability, the interview has been shortened, linguistically adapted and structurally optimized.

Another opinion from an expert can be found here.

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Colby says: "a core of American foreign policy that is similar to traditional British foreign policy with regard to the European continent; which is to deny any state the opportunity to dominate a key region of the world."

What does that actually mean? He doesn't define what "dominate" means in this context. Does it mean philosophically, economically, militarily, scientifically, theologically or something else? And "key region of the world"? Isn't it the case that theoretically sovereign states are expected to dominate their own particular region of the world, which is "key" to them, unless they are colonies or subjects of some other state, which would mean that they aren't sovereign in reality. How does one state "deny" something to another? The two most apparent ways are blockades and war.

A key aspect in the Apollo interview is one that seems to be a major concern of US foreign policy, Taiwan, the relocated Republic of China. While Taiwan and the People's Republic or Communist China have managed to spend 75 years with separate governments and locations but extensive trade relations, Colby and others have basically scheduled an immanent mainland China invasion of their island cousin. This means that the US must prevent this by greatly expanding its available military posture in East Asia, which also means that billions of dollars must go to US defense contractors, a shrinking pool of specialized corporations that depend on international enmity and distrust for their own survival.

A demonstration of US capabilities was carried out with Pacific Skies 24 along the east Asian coasts. The many other countries involved need the project to exercise their equipment.